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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jerry E. Vavold appeals from the summary dismissal of his untimely
petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts, as a matter of first impression, that
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006), should be given
retroactive application.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Vavold's conviction and sentence for
lewd conduct with a child under the age of sixteen on October 27, 2000. State v.
Vavold, 2000 Unpublished Opinion No. 696, Docket No. 26129 (Idaho App.,
October 27, 2000). Over seven years later, on November 26, 2007, Vavold filed
a petition for post-conviction relief under Idaho's Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act ("UPCPA"). (R., pp. 3-9.) The factual basis for his petition was
Vavold's claim that he was not "allowed councel [sic] at the [sexual abuse]
evaluation." (R., p. 8.)
The state moved for summary disposition on two bases: that the petition
was untimely and that it failed to factually support a cognizable claim upon which
post-conviction relief could be granted. (R., pp. 10-17.) Vavold, through counsel,
responded to the state's motion. (R., pp. 21-26.) Included with the response
were court minutes from the underlying criminal case, showing that a sexual
abuse evaluation was ordered for sentencing, and a new affidavit by Vavold,
asserting that a sexual history was part of that evaluation and that the evaluation
was submitted to the court by Vavold's counsel. (R., pp. 27-30.) Vavold also
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requested the trial court to take judicial notice of the "records, file and pleadings"
of the underlying criminal case. (R., p. 32.) The district court did so except as to
the PSI and the evaluation itself. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 17-22; p. 14, L. 12-p. 15, L. 1.)
After a hearing at which it took argument (R., p. 34; see generally, Tr.), the
district court granted the state's motion (R., pp. 35-48).

Although the district

court specifically recognized that the state was also requesting summary
disposition for inadequate factual allegations (R., p. 38), it did not address this
issue after finding that the petition was untimely (R., pp. 38-47; Tr., p. 15, Ls. 28). Vavold filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 51-53.)
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ISSUE
Vavold states the issue on appeal as:
The issue before this Court is whether Estrada announced a
new rule of law when it held that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attached to a court-ordered psychosexual evaluation[.]
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Vavold failed to show error in the district court's determination that
Vavold's petition, filed about seven years after resolution of the appeal in the
underlying criminal case, was untimely under the UPCPA's one-year limitation for
filing petitions?

3

ARGUMENT
Vavold's Petition Was Not Filed Within The One-Year Time Limit Mandated By
The UPCPA
A.

Introduction
The district court dismissed Vavold's untimely petition for post-conviction

relief.

Although Vavold never mentions the statutory basis for dismissal, he

apparently argues that he should be excused from the UPCPA's one-year
limitation period for filing a petition because the holding of Estrada v. State, 143
Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006), should be given retroactive application.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 6-20.)

Vavold's argument is without merit for three

reasons. First, there is no "retroactivity" exception to the one-year filing deadline
of I.C. § 19-4902(a). Second, even if there were such an exception, the holding
of Estrada meets no test for retroactive application. Finally, even if Estrada had
announced a new rule meriting retroactive application Vavold would not be
entitled to pursue his untimely petition because it does not set forth a prirna facie
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the rubric of Estrada.

8.

Standard Of Review
The application of a statute of limitation to an action under a given set of

facts is a question of law subject to free review on appeal. Evensiosky v. State,
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001); State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244,
245, 796 P.2d 121, 122 (1990); Cochran
128, 129 (Ct App. 1999).
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v.

State, 133 Idaho 205,206,984 P.2d

C.

The UPCPA Does Not Include A "Retroactivity" Exception To Its One-Year
Filing Requirement
A proceeding under the UPCPA "may be filed at any time within one (1)

year ... from the determination of an appeal .... " !.C. § 19-4902(a). Absent a
showing by the petitioner that the one-year statute of limitation should be tolled,
the failure to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief is a basis for dismissal
of the petition. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001); Sayas
v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 959, 88 P.3d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 2003).
Vavold has presented no claim that the limitation period of I.C. § 194902(a) should be tolled. On the contrary, he has claimed that the issuance of
an opinion by the Idaho Supreme Court should be given retroactive application
and that this justifies dispensing with the UPCPA limitation period. He has cited
no Idaho case holding that retroactive application of a case is grounds for filing a
post-conviction petition outside of the one-year limitation period of the UPCPA.
(See generally, Appellant's brief.)
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of that
statute. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). Those
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute
must be construed as a whole. Id. Where the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, the court must give effect to the statute as written, without
engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988
P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581
(1996).
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The language of t.C. § 19-4902(a) is plain: a petition must be brought
"within one (1) year ... from the determination of an appeal" of the underlying
criminal case.

The statute contains no provision exempting claims based on

some new authority or legal rule. Vavold has cited to no authority holding that he
is entitled by constitution or statute to collaterally attack his conviction or
sentence in Idaho courts beyond the bounds set by the Idaho Legislature. The
plain language of the statute does not include any "retroactivity" exception for
collateral attacks on a conviction under the UPCPA, and therefore Vavold has
failed to show error in the dismissal of his untimely petition. 1

D.

The Holding Of Estrada Does Not Meet The Applicable Test For
Retroactive Application
A decision of the Supreme Court of the United States must be given

retroactive effect to cases pending on direct review. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho
139, 141 n.1, 176 P.3d 911,913 n.1 (2007) (quoting Harper v. Virginia Dep't of
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993)). But filill State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 517,
181 P.3d 440, 443 (2008) (case law overruling precedent upon which a
defendant relied may not be given retroactive effect to defendant's detriment)

1

Moreover, even if there were a "retroactivity" exception, it would not apply to
Vavold. The Supreme Court of Idaho decided Estrada on November 24, 2006.
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). Vavold filed his petition
more than a year later, on November 26, 2007. (R., p. 3.) Even if Vavold were
entitled to the benefit of the "mailbox rule," he sent his petition on November 21,
2007. (R., p. 7.) Mailing his petition 362 days after Estrada was decided was not
within a "reasonable time." See Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d
870 (2007) (successive petitions must be filed within reasonable time of learning
facts underlying new claims). Although ii does not appear that Vavold's petition
is successive, the "reasonable time" standard is appropriate to avoid multiple
standards for when petitions based on "new rules" must be filed.
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(citing State v. Moon, 140 Idaho 609, 611, 97 P.3d 476, 478 (Ct. App. 2004)).
Decisions of the Supreme Court generally need not, however, be given
retroactive effect on a collateral challenge to a conviction. See, M.,, Hoffman v.
State, 142 Idaho 27, 29, 121 P.3d 958, 960 (2005) (decision requiring jury
determination of defendant's eligibility for death penalty not given retroactive
application to cases not on direct review); Stuart v. State, 128 Idaho 436, 438,
914 P.2d 933, 935 (1996) (stating, in dicta, that new decision of Idaho Supreme
Court would not apply retroactively in collateral challenge to sentence). Instead,
the holding of a case will be given retroactive application in collateral challenges
to a judgment only if the holding of the case represents a "new rule" that
"'requires observance of procedures 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'
In Re: Gafford, 127 Idaho 472, 476, 903 P.2d 61, 65 (1995) (quoting Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), and Teague v. lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)
(plurality opinion)). 2 The holding in Estrada, however, is. neither a "new rule" nor
one that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
1.

Estrada Did Not Create A "New Rule"

The holding in Estrada was not a "new rule." A "new rule" is one not
dictated by existing precedent and that was susceptible to reasonable debate at
the time judgment was rendered. Gafford, 127 Idaho at 476 n.1, 903 P.2d at 65
n.1 (citing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990)). The holdings of the

2

The adoption of the Teague standard in In re: Gafford (albeit arguably in dicta)
seems to belie the assertion that Idaho courts follow a different retroactivity
standard than the Supreme Court of the United States. Vavold cites no case
more recent than 1982 for the proposition that Idaho may employ a different
standard. (Appellant's brief, pp. 17-19.)
7

Idaho Supreme Court in Estrada were, by the Court's own reasoning, dictated by
precedent and not susceptible to debate; therefore, the holdings do not constitute
any "new rule."
Estrada was convicted of rape and ordered by the district court to undergo
a psychosexual evaluation. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 560, 149 P.3d 833,
835 (2006). Estrada initially did not want to participate in the evaluation, but did
after being advised to do so by his counsel.

&

Estrada claimed in post-

conviction proceedings that his counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him
that his privilege against compelled self-incrimination extended to participation in
the psychosexual evaluation.

&

The district court agreed that counsel's failure

to so advise Estrada was deficient performance, but held that Estrada had failed
to establish prejudice. Id. at 560-61, 149 P.3d at 835-36. The Idaho Court of
Appeals affirmed, but on the grounds that there was no clear law that a
defendant could invoke his privilege against self-incrimination to refuse
participation in a sentencing evaluation, and therefore his counsel's performance
was not deficient in failing to so advise Estrada.

& at 561, 149 P.3d at 836.

The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the lower courts.

In so doing, the

Court first held that the Sixth Amendment applied to Estrada's claim, but noted its
holding was "limited to the finding that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right
to counsel regarding only the decision of whether to submit to a psychosexual
exam."

&

at 562-63, 149 P.3d at 837-38 (emphasis added). The Court then

addressed whether counsel's performance had been deficient, and stated "[t]his
Court's decisions clearly indicate that both at the point of sentencing and earlier,
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for purposes of a psychological evaluation, a defendant's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination applies." ]Q,_ at 563, 149 P.3d at 838. Finally,
the court found prejudice. ]Q,_ at 565, 149 P.3d at 840.
That the Estrada Court itself felt it was applying an "old rule" instead of a
"new rule" is apparent from the Estrada decision. The Idaho Court of Appeals
had specifically held that it was declaring a "new rule" under the Fifth
Amendment, which was the basis of its holding that Estrada's counsel could not
be held to have performed deficiently.

The Idaho Supreme Court reversed,

however, concluding that the law was sufficiently well established to have
required Estrada's trial counsel to have advised him of his right against
compulsory self-incrimination in relation to the psychosexual evaluation.
Vavold argues that Estrada enunciates a "new rule" under the Sixth
Amendment because it was not clear that the right to counsel's advice in relation
to a psychological evaluation had not been clearly applied in non-capital cases.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 10-16.) There are two flaws in this argument. First, Vavold
has cited to no authority extant at the time that Estrada was decided that even
suggests that counsel would not be considered ineffective for giving erroneous
legal advice in relation to pre-sentencing evaluations.

That the state never

argued in Estrada that the Sixth Amendment did not apply, Estrada, 143 Idaho at
561, 149 P.3d at 836 ("neither party" raised issue of applicability of Sixth
Amendment), indicates that there was no ground for "reasonable debate" on this
issue when Estrada was decided.
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The second flaw in this argument is that the Estrada Court clearly thought
the rule well enough established to conclude that counsel should have known of
his duty to advise his client. "Under the Teague framework, an old rule applies
both on direct and collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable only to
cases that are still on direct review." Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, _ ,
127 S.Ct. 1173, 1180 (2007). Estrada was seeking collateral review: if the Idaho
Supreme Court had concluded it was applying a "new rule," then Estrada himself
would have been unable to take advantage of the "new rule," and the Supreme
Court would have affirmed the lower courts.
The Supreme Court of the United States has also rejected an argument
almost identical to that made by Vavold in this case. In Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S.
211 (1988), the South Carolina Supreme Court held that precedent of the
Supreme Court of the United States (Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307(1985)) did
not apply retroactively. Aiken, 484 U.S. at 213. The South Carolina Attorney
General argued this was so because the Francis case was a "new rule" that was
not otherwise retroactively applicable.

Id. at 215.

The Court rejected this

argument, concluding that in the controlling case (Francis) the Court had merely
applied the rule announced in a prior case, and had stated in Francis that it was
so doing. lf!., at 215-17.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Estrada at least implicitly concluded it was
not applying a "new rule."

It certainly rejected the Idaho Court of Appeals'

reasoning that Estrada was not entitled to relief because the Fifth Amendment
rule it was applying was "new." If the rule in Estrada was in fact new (but failed
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to otherwise qualify for retroactive application) it would not have applied to
Estrada himself, or to any other defendant whose direct review was completed
prior to issuance of the Estrada opinion. Vavold has failed to carry his burden of
demonstrating that the Sixth Amendment rule in question was "new."

2.

Even If The Rule Announced In Estrada Were New. It Was Not
"Watershed"

Vavold has fajled to show that the rule announced in Estrada, even if it
were "new," meets the legal standards for retroactive application.

As stated

above, even a "new rule" is not retroactively applied unless it "'requires the
observance of procedures 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'

In Re:

Gafford, 127 Idaho 472,476,903 P.2d 61, 65 (1995) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302 (1989), and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality
opinion)). A "new rule" does not meet this standard unless it is a "watershed rule
of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the
criminal proceeding." Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, _ , 127 S.Ct. 1173,
1181 (2007) (brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted). "This exception
is extremely narrow." Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). The Supreme
Court has "observed that it is unlikely that any such rules have yet to emerge."
lg_, (brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted). The Court has also, in

every case since Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), rejected every claim that
a new rule should be applied retroactively. Id. at 1181-82 (see cases cited). The
"new rule" articulated in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding
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confront declarant), did not qualify as "watershed." Bockting, 549 U.S. at _ ,
127 at 1182-84.
Vavold has failed to show that the rule announced in Estrada, even if new,
was "watershed."
In order to qualify as watershed, a new rule must meet two
requirements. First, the rule must be necessary to prevent an
impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction. Second, the
rule must alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural
elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.
Bockting, 549 U.S. at_, 127 at 1182 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Application of this standard shows that Estrada's rule is not "watershed."
The Supreme Court of the United States addressed application of the
retroactivity standard to new sentencing rules in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S.
348 (2004), where the Court decided that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)
(holding that statutory aggravators that make a defendant eligible for the death
penalty must be decided by a jury), is not subject to retroactive application.
The Court first noted the applicable standard for the first part of the twopart test set forth above, then stated, "That a new procedural rule is
'fundamental' in some abstract sense is not enough; the rule must be one without
which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." Schriro,
542 U.S. at 352 (emphasis original, quotation marks and citations omitted).
Thus, in that case "the question is whether judicial factfinding so seriously
diminishes accuracy that there is an impermissibly large risk of punishing
conduct the law does not reach."

kt. at 355-56 (emphasis original, quotation

marks, brackets, and citations omitted). The Court stated it was "implausible that
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judicial factfinding so seriously diminishes accuracy as to produce an
impermissibly large risk of injustice."

j_g_.,_

at 356 (emphasis original, quotation

marks, brackets, and citations omitted). Thus, the Ring rule was not "watershed."
j_g_.,_

Here Vavold has not established that sentencing under the rubric of law
prior to Estrada "seriously diminishes" the accuracy of factfinding in sentencing
such there was an "impermissibly large risk of injustice." There is no indication
that a significant number of defendants will chose to exercise their Fifth
Amendment rights and forgo an evaluation. Those who choose to participate in
the evaluation are in the same position as all defendants pre-Estrada, and are
not at greater risk of injustice than those who refuse the evaluation. In addition,
depriving the sentencing court of an evaluation seems more calculated to making
factfinding regarding rehabilitation potential less accurate, rather

than more

accurate; indeed, it seems apparent that most defendants who exercise their
rights and refuse an evaluation out of fear of incrimination will do so with the
hope that factfinding at sentencing will be less accurate. In short, while trials,

sentencings and other court proceedings cannot be counted on to be accurate if
a defendant is entirely deprived of all rights to counsel, the rule that counsel have
an obligation to accurately describe to their clients their right to refuse a
sentencing evaluation is not a rule that seriously enhances the accuracy of
sentencing.
Likewise, having counsel's advice on the right to remain silent for a
psychosexual evaluation does not "alter our understanding of the bedrock
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procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding." Indeed, having
that advice merely allows a defendant to make a tactical decision whether to
participate in an evaluation because he believes participation will ultimately help
at sentencing, or decline to participate because he believes participation will be
incriminating in the sense that it would lead to a longer sentence. An evaluation
itself is not constitutionally required; whether a defendant invokes his right to
silence and participates in the evaluation or instead elects to not participate is
simply not a bedrock procedural element essential to a fair sentencing.
Vavold does not even try to apply this standard in his case.

On the

contrary, he argues that any new rule expanding the right to effective assistance
of counsel in any way is watershed. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-17 (citing Howard
v. United States, 374 F.3d 1068, 1078 (11 th Cir. 2004).)
The flaw in this argument is that in Howard and the cases it cites, the
issue was denial of counsel, not merely whether the defendant had the effective
assistance of counsel. See Howard, 374 F.3d at 1077-81 {applying Alabama v.

Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), retroactively to hold that an uncounseled guilty
plea may not be used as a prior conviction for enhancement). In Estrada there
was no claim that Estrada was denied counsel; his only claim was that his
counsel had acted ineffectively when he encouraged Estrada to participate in the
evaluation without informing him that he had a right to not participate. Estrada,
143 Idaho at 562-63, 149 P.3d at 837-38 (Estrada's right articulated as right to
advice, not presence). There is a fundamental difference between the absolute
denial of counsel and a holding that counsel was constitutionally required to give

14

accurate advice on legal rights that might have been asserted in relation to an
ordered psychological evaluation.
In Estrada the Idaho Supreme Court applied the holding of Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981 ), in the context of a non-capital case, stating that it
would "make no sense" to afford a criminal defendant the right to counsel at the
guilty plea hearing and sentencing but then hold that he was not "entitled to the
advice of counsel in the interim period regarding a psychosexual evaluation."
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562.

Vavold has failed to show how this ruling is

"watershed," as that term is defined in the law.
E.

Even If Estrada Were Retroactively Applicable. Vavold Did Not State A
Cognizable Claim Under Estrada
The Estrada court limited its holding of a right to counsel to "the finding

that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel regarding only the
I

decision of whether to submit to a psychosexual exam," distinguishing the
right to "assistance of counsel" from the right to "presence of counsel." Estrada,
143 Idaho at 562-63 (bolding added, italics original). Thus, the Court recognized
only a right to have counsel correctly advise the defendant of the right to silence
so that the defendant can elect whether to participate in the evaluation; it did not
recognize a right to the presence of counsel during the evaluation or to object to
bits and pieces of the evaluation.
Vavold did not assert a claim cognizable under Estrada. On the contrary,
it is clear that Vavold asserted a right to have counsel present and to object to
only certain parts of the evaluation - a right never recognized in Estrada.
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Vavold set forth his claim as "failure to have counsel at a criticle [sic] stage
in the evaluation - denied Vth [sic] Amend. rights." (R., p. 5.) His initial affidavit
in support of his claim states that he "was never allowed councel [sic] at the
evaluation" and that he "requested an attorney, but was told the court ordered it."

(R., p. 8.) After being given counsel in post-conviction, Vavold filed an affidavit
stating that the evaluator assigned by the court could not complete the evaluation
in time for sentencing, so Vavold "then obtained an evaluation from another
psychologist, Dr. Jerry Doke, to comply with the court's order." (R., p. 30.) The
affidavit then alleges, "My attorney submitted that evaluation to the court." (R., p.
30.)

Vavold also states that, to the best of his recollection, the evaluation

included "details of my sexual history and [that history] was used to reach
conclusions in the evaluation." (R., p. 30.)
Vavold never asserted that his counsel did not advise him of his right to
refuse to participate in the evaluation. Rather, he asserted that he was denied
the presence of counsel at the evaluation itself. Further, Vavold did not allege
that, if informed of his right, he would not have undergone the evaluation. (R.,
pp. 8, 29-30.) His complaints instead center on one aspect of the evaluation the sexual history - as the part of the evaluation he would not have participated
in. (R., p. 30.)
Estrada did not recognize a right to presence of counsel to object to
limited parts of an evaluation as Vavold stated as his cause of action. Because
Vavold did not state a cause of action cognizable under Estrada, he has failed to
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show error in the summary dismissal of his claim even if Estrada were to be
given retroactive effect.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
summarily dismissing Vavold's petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 8th day of January 20 9.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of January 2009 I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
TERESA A. HAMPTON
Hampton & Elliott
PO Box 1352
Boise, 83701-1352

KKJ/pm

17

